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This paper presents a unique empirical analysis of Salop and Scheffman’s raising rival’s cost theory of 
predation.  The cost efficiency of cooperative wholesaling organizations including the nations largest, 
Wakefern Food Corporation, are highly susceptible to throughput volume.  The Royal Ahold/Pathmark 
offer to purchase Wakefern’s largest member via a bankruptcy proceeding that attempted to supercede 
its membership contract, if consummated, would have reduced Wakefern’s volume by 13 percent.  It 
also would have triggered a domino effect of other member exits because it would have raised the costs 
of supplying remaining members.  This report marshals the available empirical evidence to demonstrate 
that the predatory move by Royal Ahold and Pathmark would most likely be very profitable for them 
because it would have diminished competition in many markets where they compete with ShopRite 
supermarkets.  Thus in this case, the move is credible. 
 
Key words:  predation, market power, wholesale concentration, cost efficiency 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The Ahold offer to buy Big V has immediate 
horizontal competitive effects at the market and trade 
area level in areas where Big V ShopRite® competes 
with Ahold supermarkets.  These direct horizontal 
impacts are analyzed in Cotterill (2002).  Subsequent to 
its original offer, Ahold amended its plan by partnering 
with Pathmark.  Pathmark agreed to purchase the 
Trenton, N.J. Big V stores ostensibly to alleviate 
antitrust concerns in that local market area (Murray, 
2002).  Although this may mitigate direct horizontal 
impacts in Trenton, N.J., it provides no relief in the other 
horizontal markets: Newburgh, N.Y., Poughkeepsie, 
NY, and Westchester County N.Y. Moreover, the 
Ahold/Pathmark offer has a second far more substantial 
impact throughout the northeast U.S. coastal region.  Big 
V is the largest member of the Wakefern Food 
Corporation ShopRite® Cooperative of supermarket 
retailers.  If Ahold and Pathmark purchase Big V, they 
will raise the costs of key competitors: the Wakefern 
Food Corporation and its remaining members. This cost 
elevation will reduce price competition and may 
ultimately drive key competitors, i.e. ShopRite® 
supermarkets, out of business.  The elimination of 
competition at wholesale as well as the retail level will 
elevate prices in many markets in New Jersey, New 
York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Delaware.   
  This report analyzes the economics of this predatory 
move by Ahold/Pathmark in two stages.  First, we 
assume that the predatory move in fact does drive 
Wakefern and its members out of business.  The 
structural impact on wholesale markets in the region is 
extremely large.  Analysis of the changes in local retail 
market concentration and retail food price levels 
document the impact on consumers.  It also establishes 
the p ay-off matrix for Ahold and Pathmark from this 
predatory move.  
  The second stage of our analysis addresses the 
impact of the loss of its largest member, Big V 
Supermarkets, on the Wakefern Cooperative grocery 
wholesale operation and its remaining members.  The 
critical question is whether the loss of Big V triggers an 
implosion of the cooperative?  Will other members of 
the cooperative fail, causing the wholesale volume of the 
group to continue to shrink, further elevating costs and 
causing more members to fail?  This is the “domino 
effect.”  Also, given the payoff to Ahold and Pathmark 
from the demise of the ShopRite® supermarket 
cooperative and the known amount that they are paying 
out to capture Big V, do the predators have remaining 
gains that they can use to capture other ShopRites as 
they are forced into bankruptcy? In other words, can the 
predators actively insure that the domino effect occurs 
by picking off other ShopRite members?  
In addition to addressing the Ahold/Pathmark 
predatory move, we also  analyze a hypothetical 
acquisition of Big V by an outside buyer to demonstrate 
that the predatory impacts on wholesale and retail 
markets are merger specific.  An outside buyer is defined 
to be a purchaser that may operate supermarkets 
elsewhere in the United States but currently does not 
operate in markets that ShopRite® supplies.  This 
outside buyer does not join the ShopRite® cooperative.  
If it did, there would be no cost elevation or predatory 
impact.  We demonstrate that an outside buyer reaps no 
anti-competitive pay-off.  As a result, an outside buyer 
would not be willing to pay more than what the 
ShopRite® cooperative is willing to pay for its bankrupt 
member’s stores.  Therefore the current purchase 
proposal by Ahold/Pathmark is the only economically 
rational move that is predatory, and its benefits for those 
chains are inextricably intertwined with the exercise of 
market power that damages consumers.  
2.  Underlying Facts 
 
The current situation includes the following facts 
that are important for our analysis.  Royal Ahold has 
offered to purchase 27 Big V ShopRites® for $255 
million.  The Trenton stores are to be spun off to 
Pathmark.  Royal Ahold already purchased arguably the 
two newest and best Big V Shop Rites® (the Hyde Park 
and Beekman Road stores i n the Poughkeepsie market).  
Wakefern Food Cooperation (WFC), the wholesale 
cooperative consisting of ShopRite® supermarket 
owners offered to purchase the 27 Big V ShopRites® for 
$155 million.  Big V is WFC’s largest member, and its 
exit from the cooperative would reduce its sales at 
wholesale 13 percent.   
3.  The Predatory Impact of the Ahold/Pathmark 
Move on Wholesale Markets 
  The wholesale grocery supply industry for 
independent supermarket operators in the southern New 
York, New Jersey, eastern Pennsylvania and Connecticut 
geographic market areas is highly concentrated.  
Wakefern and C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (“C&S”) 
are two of the nation’s leading wholesalers.  Wakefern is 
the nation’s seventh largest wholesaler with $3.95 billion 
in sales in 2000; and, C&S is the fourth largest with $7.1 
billion in sales in 2000 (Trade Dimensions, p. 43).  They 
are key players in northeast coastal wholesale markets 
from Connecticut to Philadelphia.  C&S has enjoyed 
phenomenal growth because it has assumed grocery The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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wholesaling activities for many leading supermarket 
chains in the region, including A&P, Pathmark, 
Safeway, Stop and Shop and Giant Food Stores/Super G 
(Trade Dimensions, p. 88).  It also purchased 170 
bankrupt Grand Union supermarkets.  It sold 36 to Stop 
and Shop and 20 to Tops (Ahold chains), 5 to Hannaford 
(Trade Dimensions, p. 65) and others to Pathmark.  It 
also operates 30 Grand Unions (Trade Dimensions, p. 
88). 
  Given its strategic alliances with large chains, C&S 
does not operate like a typical cooperative or voluntary 
wholesaler.  It does not focus upon independents and 
small chains in a fashion that enables these chains to 
compete more effectively with leading supermarket 
chains.  It does, however, supply a few traditional 
independents such as AR-DE’s, a nine store operator in 
Norwich, New York ( Trade Dimensions,  Marketing 
Guidebook, 2002 p. 104).  C&S offers a private label 
program (Best Way, Red and White) to independents 
that affiliate with it, but the program is weak.  AR-DE’s, 
for example, has no  private label lines.  C&S 
warehouses and delivers whatever each particular large 
chain orders, including its private label line. 
  The C&S focus on large leading supermarket chains 
very well may compromise its incentives to supply 
independents and small chains that compete with its 
large customers.  Consequently, they may supply such 
chains at a higher wholesale cost and with less-than top-
flight private labels, merchandising, advertising, and 
promotion services.  As a result, C&S’ primary 
customers, most notably the Royal Ahold and Pathmark 
chains in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and 
Delaware, typically may face less effective competition.  
The resulting price elevation at retail by large, leading 
chains could easily be shared with C&S “in payment” 
for  its protection of its key retail customers.  Any 
increase in C&S’ domination of wholesale markets in 
the region as a consequence of the Ahold/Pathmark 
acquisition of Big V would strengthen this strategic 
alliance and increase the potential for the exercise of 
market power to the detriment of consumers in the 
region.  Note that C&S sold no Grand Union stores to 
local or regional supermarket chains. 
  WFC/ShopRite® on the other hand, is a cooperative 
venture that is committed and inextricably tied to the 
success of independent supermarket operators (less than 
10 stores), as well as local and regional supermarket 
chains.  The ShopRite® program, with its common logo, 
joint advertising and promotion campaigns, loyalty card 
program, and extensive line of private label products, 
provides a platform for competing against leading chain 
supermarkets.  C&S does not offer most of these 
programs.  Moreover, a recent trial involving Wakefern 
and Big V documented that if Big V were to switch to 
C&S, its actual annual wholesale cost would increase at 
least $30 million over its current WFC ShopRite® cost 
(Big V Supermarkets et al. v. Wakefern Food Corp).  
The chain then would be less able to compete with C&S 
-supplied Stop & Shop and Pathmark stores. WFC is a 
low cost supplier to superstore operators such as Big V.  
The wholesale cost advantage of the Wakefern ShopRite 
system in part undoubtedly comes, as we document 
below, from its near exclusive focus on superstores 
(supermarkets with more than 30,000 square feet of 
selling floor space and more than $12 million in annual 
sales). 
  There is other evidence of the strength of the 
WFC/ShopRite® system.  Consider its private label 
program.  ShopRite® private label products capture 24 
percent of retail sales.  In comparison, SUPERVALU 
private label penetration is only 6.9 percent of sales.  
Although we do not have an estimate of private label 
penetration for independent and small chain operators 
who may use the C&S private labels, we strongly expect 
that it is near the low level of SUPERVALU private 
label.  Only Wakefern provides a private label program 
to its member retailers that is equal in penetration to 
Pathmark (24 percent) and superior to Hannaford (19.2 
percent).
1   
  Table 1 identifies all supermarket wholesalers in the 
Northeast Coastal region, which is defined to include the 
following wholesale market areas delineated in the 2002 
Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook:  Boston, 
Hartford, New York, Philadelphia and 
Baltimore/Washington.  SUPERVALU ranks first in 
terms of total number of stores supplied  (629) and C&S 
ranks second with 615 stores.  More important for 
analysis of competition between medium and large 
format supermarket operators are the wholesalers who 
are equipped for and routinely supply such stores, i.e. 
superstores.  The second and third column identifies 
wholesalers who sell to superstores.  C&S is far and 
away the most important wholesaler to superstores, 
supplying 415 stores because it supplies the leading 
chains in the region.  These stores account for 67.5 
percent of C&S stores supplied.  SUPERVALU is 
second with 212 superstores, but these stores account for 
only 33.7% of all stores supplied.  SUPERVALU deals 
with a large number of small stores with an attendant 
increase in wholesaling costs.   
                                                             
1 Penetration for ShopRite is via communication with Joseph 
Sheridan a Wakefern executive on March 21, 2002.  The other 
rates are from  Griffin Report, p. 20.  We do not have a 
penetration rate for the Ahold chains in this matter, Stop and 
Shop or Super G, but expect it to be over 20 percent. The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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  WFC/ShopRite® i s a close third with 195 
superstores and these stores account for 95.1% of the 
WFC/ShopRite® stores.  WFC/ShopRite® is the only 
wholesaler that almost exclusively supplies superstores.  
This gives ShopRite® a pure systems and logistics 
advantage over competing wholesalers.  As a 
cooperative, Wakefern does business at cost and passes 
that advantage on to its independent and “small” chain 
members.  We put “small” in quotes because Big V, the 
largest cooperative member, operated over 30 
supermarkets with retail sales of approximately $950 
million at its peak.  Other ShopRite® members have 
sales above $500 million but many members are earlier 
in the firm growth cycle with single stores and sales in 
the $12-$30 million range. 
  Let us shift now to market positions, market shares 
and concentration indices for three critical wholesale 
markets in this matter:  the greater New York City 
metropolitan area, the greater Philadelphia metropolitan 
area, and the greater Hartford metropolitan area.  These 
three areas cover Connecticut, southern New York, New 
Jersey, and southeastern Pennsylvania.  When 
computing wholesale market shares, we include only 
those firms who would supply independents and small 
chains.  In other words, we include what the industry 
calls cooperative and voluntary wholesalers.  We do not 
include integrated supermarket chains that operate their 
own warehouse, distribution, private label, advertising, 
merchandising and promotion programs. 
  Table 2 examines the New York City metropolitan 
area wholesale market.  We have computed market 
shares for the grocery wholesale market and for the 
supermarket wholesale market. The grocery wholesale 
market shares and corresponding concentration indices 
are straightforward and give strong evidence that this 
market is highly concentrated.  Four-firm concentration 
is 82 percent and the HHI is 2,106.   
  If Wakefern is driven out of business, who would 
pick up its wholesale market shares?  To the extent that 
Ahold-owned chains (Stop & Shop and Super G), 
Pathmark, and Grand Union capture share at retail, most 
of the wholesale business would be captured by their 
supplier in the region, C&S.  Since these are leading 
retail supermarket chains in the region, the 
Ahold/Pathmark proposed acquisition of Big V promises 
major market share gains at wholesale for C&S, and 
increased wholesaler concentration.  
  If all of Wakefern’s wholesale business is captured 
by C&S, the wholesale grocery HHI increases 1,667 
points to 3,773.  Since C&S customers would capture 
the lion’s share of ShopRite®  sales, the wholesale 
grocery HHI would most certainly increase more than 
100 points with the weakening and possible demise of 
Wakefern.  Thus the Big V acquisition clearly violates 
the merger guidelines.  Resulting concentration is above 
1,800 and the increase in the HHI is above 100 points.   
  The grocery concentration ratios reported in Table 2 
include non-supermarket grocery stores (shares with 
sales of less than $4.16 million annually, convenience 
stores, limited assortment stores and wholesale club 
stores).  To obtain a more accurate reading of market 
concentration for the supermarket segment of the 
grocery industry, we define supermarket wholesale 
market share by excluding those wholesalers where less 
than 10 percent of their stores supplied are superstores.  
If superstores account for less than 10 percent of a 
wholesaler’s stores, that firm is focusing on small 
supermarkets and other grocery stores.  This means that 
they are not set up to compete with wholesalers such as 
Wakefern and C&S. 
  Table 2 indicates that the greater New York City 
wholesale market for supermarkets is even more 
concentrated than the grocery wholesale market.  There 
are effectively only 3 wholesalers that focus upon 
supplying supermarkets.  WFC/ShopRite® has the 
largest market share at 39.9%.  C&S is second at 34.5%, 
White Rose is a distant third at 22.4%, and 
SUPERVALU completes the supply chain with a 
miniscule 3.2%.  Four-firm concentration is 100% and 
the HHI is 3,294.  If Wakefern fails and C&S captures 
all of its wholesale business, the HHI increases 2,751 
points to 6,045.  Although this is a worst-case scenario 
in the event of a Wakefern failure, given the strong 
positions of C&S large chain customers, it is not 
implausible.     
  Table 3 reports similar market share data for t he 
greater Philadelphia area.  Grocery and supermarket 
wholesale shares are identical because no wholesalers in 
this market focuses exclusively on smaller grocery 
stores.  SUPERVALU and Fleming are important and 
the market is effectively split four ways between 
Wakefern, C&S, and the other two.  Nonetheless, market 
concentration is extremely high with CR4=100% and the 
HHI=2,545.  The demise of Wakefern would only 
increase concentration further.  Again as Royal Ahold, 
Pathmark and other C&S supplied chains c apture 
ShopRite®’s share at retail, the C&S share expands.  If 
C&S captured all of Wakefern sales in this area, the HHI 
would increase 1,498 points to 4,043.   
  Table 4 examines the greater Hartford market area 
(Connecticut, western Massachusetts and southern 
Vermont).  Here, we discuss only supermarket 
concentration.  C&S has a dominant position with 55.6 
percent of the market.  The only other competitors are 
SUPERVALU (25.28%) and WFC/ShopRite® (19.1%).  
Concentration is high and the demise of The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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WFC/ShopRite® would force it higher.  If C&S 
captured all of the Wakefern business in this area, the 
HHI would increase 2,123 points to 6,222. 
 
4. Competitive Effects: A Vertical Squeeze Play on 
Independents and Local Chains 
 
  The existing vertical strategic alliances in the region 
between C&S and leading supermarket chains augurs ill 
for competition at the retail and wholesale level.  Again, 
we stress the fact that voluntary wholesalers traditionally 
have competed against leading supermarket chains via 
independent and small chain retailers.  C&S is different; 
it is allied with leading chains.   
  The benefits to C&S from increased share and 
wholesale market concentration are intertwined with the 
benefits that its retail partners capture.  The elimination 
of Wakefern means that C&S is the primary remaining 
supplier of independent and regional or local chain 
superstore operators.  If C&S refuses to supply these 
operators or supplies them at a higher cost (Robinson 
Patman is assumed dead here), then its retail partners 
face less competition and can elevate prices.  Other 
barriers to entry at the retail level also contribute to retail 
price elevation.  If the retail members of the strategic 
alliance stay with C&S, then C&S faces no substantial 
competition at wholesale.  There is a positive feedback 
loop for vertical cooperation.  The strategic alliance 
between the dominant wholesaler and leading retail 
chains in the region ensures the market positions of both 
and enables them to jointly exercise market power to 
increase prices and profits.   Independents, regional, and 
local chains that would compete in retail markets are 
precluded from doing so, and consequently, consumers 
suffer.   
5.  The Predatory Impact of the Ahold/Pathmark 
Move on Retail Markets, It’s Impact on Consumers, 
and It’s Payoff for Ahold/Pathmark 
   
  In this section, we analyze the completion of the Big 
V acquisition as envisioned by Ahold and Pathmark.  
Again, assume that this strategic move forces Wakefern-
ShopRite out of business.  In the next section, we will 
analyze this assumption and document that it is valid.  
As outlined in the introduction, conduct that raises rivals 
costs can force them out of a market.  Consequently, 
market concentration and consumer prices may increase.  
It is that impact that we address here.  Also, since Ahold 
and Pathmark operate in many markets where this 
occurs, they may be able to recoup their “investment” 
via higher prices in this predatory game that they are 
playing. 
  The ceiling on Ahold and Pathmark’s investment to 
destroy Wakefern/ShopRite is the difference between the 
Ahold $255 million offer and the $155 million that 
Wakefern is willing to pay for Big V.  To the extent that 
increases in Ahold’s and Pathmark’s horizontal market 
power within the Big V territory increase their profits, 
this gain would offset at least some of the $100 million 
investment that Ahold and Pathmark are making to 
destroy the Wakefern/ShopRite® supermarket group 
elsewhere.  Therefore $100 million is the upper bound of 
Ahold/Pathmark’s investment to destroy 
Wakefern/ShopRite in other markets.  
  Now let us analyze how Ahold and Pathmark can 
recoup their investment.  The impact on consumers is an 
intermediate step. We start with a detailed and extensive 
county database that is derived from Spectra® store-
level sales data that Wakefern has provided us. We 
compute the county market area market shares for 
supermarket operators (including ShopRite®) in all of 
the counties in the Northeast outside of the Big V 
territory where ShopRite competes with Ahold and/or 
Pathmark.     
  If the ShopRite® supermarkets go out of business, 
others in the market will capture their sales.  We assume 
that the remaining firms in the market will capture 
ShopRite® sales in proportion to their current position in 
the market.  For example, a ShopRite® owner has 20 
percent of the market, firm A has 60 percent of the 
market, firm B has 20 percent of the market, and the 
ShopRite® is forced out of business by the 
Ahold/Pathmark move.  With the symmetric capture 
assumption, firm A captures 7 5 percent and firm B 
captures 25 percent of the ShopRite® sales.  Their post-
predation market shares are 75 and 25 percent 
respectively.  This symmetric-capture assumption is 
conservative given the aggressive expansion path of both 
Stop & Shop and Super G in the northeast.  These Ahold 
chains would, in all likelihood, capture more than their 
proportional share of ShopRite® sales.  Our wholesale 
level analysis suggests that would be the case because of 
the resulting dominant position of C&S Wholesale, their 
strategic partner. A repeat of the Grand Union sale to 
Ahold chains is a very plausible scenario.  Also, Stop & 
Shop gained more than a proportional amount when the 
divestitures related to the Ahold/Edwards acquisition of 
Stop & Shop failed in the late 1990s (Cotterill, 1999). 
  Once we have the post-predation market shares for 
each remaining supermarket operator in a market, we 
compute the post-predation HHI of seller concentration.  
Then we compare post-predation HHI with the initial 
HHI, and compute the d elta (absolute) change and the 
percent change in the HHI for the market.  Using the 
estimated, significant, positive statistical relationship The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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between the HHI and the market price level for Royal 
Ahold supermarkets in the northeast coastal region (see 
Cotterill, 2002; Cotterill, 1999), we then compute the 
percent change in the markets’ retail price level.  In 
markets where the HHI increases, prices increase.  
However, for some markets where a ShopRite® owner is 
the market leader, the demise of that firm may cause the 
HHI to decrease.  Consequently, the market price level 
decreases in those markets.  
  Table 5 summarizes our computations for the 37 
counties, other than the 4 Big V counties, where 
ShopRite® owners compete against Ahold and/or 
Pathmark in the Northeast.  As documented in Table 5, 
the exit of the ShopRite® competitors increases the HHI 
in 32 of the 37 county markets.  The percent change in 
the HHI ranges from minus 39.7% to 133.5%.  The 
former is Hunterdon County, New Jersey, where the 
Colalillo ShopRites (2 stores) account for approximately 
56.5 percent of the market.  If they fail, six other firms 
including Stop and Shop capture their market share (see 
attachments), however no firm has a market share near 
56% so the HHI drops, and there is a corresponding 
2.5% drop in the market price level (Table 5).   
  The maximum increase in the HHI occurs in Warren 
County, New Jersey.  As reported in Attachment A, 
three different ShopRite owners compete in the county 
with 22%, 10%, and 30% shares of market.  In the event 
of a Wakefern failure, the market goes from 6 to 3 
competitors (Stop & Shop, A&P, and Acme) and the 
shares of these 3 firms increase dramatically.  HHI 
increases from 2,224 to 5,193, a 133% increase.  
Predicted prices increase 8.4%.   
  Within the range of the predicted price increase (i.e. 
from –2.5% to +8.4%), there is an average price increase 
of 1.7%.  
  The last two columns of Table 5 make the price 
elevation percentages concrete.  The next to the last 
column is the total annual supermarkets sales in millions 
of dollars for each county.  Multiplying these current 
sales estimates by the percent price increase gives the 
dollar increase that consumers in each county pay for 
their groceries.  If the firm’s unit cost of selling 
groceries remains constant, this transfer of income from 
consumers directly increases the net operating profit of 
the supermarket operators that remain after ShopRite’s 
demise.  In the aggregate, the existence of the ShopRite 
cooperative supermarket system prevents consumers 
from paying an additional $475 million (1.7% more for 
the region’s $28.01 billion in supermarket sales).  
Alternatively the demise of the ShopRite supermarkets 
means a substantial lessening of competition and 
consumers in these 37 markets pay an additional  $479 
million (1.7 percent) annually for groceries.   
  Next, we examine how the Ahold and Pathmark 
chains benefit from the demise of Wakefern/ShopRite.  
Table 6 gives the number of stores that ShopRite 
owners, Ahold and Pathmark operate in each county.  
This table also gives the current and the post-predation 
market shares in each county for Ahold and Pathmark.  
As expected, these chains gain market share with the 
demise of ShopRite.  The last two columns give the 
increase in market shares.  On average, Ahold county 
share increases 7 percentage points from 16.94% to 
23.94%.  For Pathmark, the average county market share 
increases 7.72 percentage points from 15.21% to 
22.93%.   
  Table 7 completes our analysis of the Ahold and 
Pathmark ability to recoup their $ 100 million (or less) 
investment in Big V to destroy Wakefern.  The first 
column gives the dollar sales increase that Ahold 
captures in each county.  In total, Ahold increases its 
annual sales $1.217 billion with the demise of 
Wakefern/ShopRite.  Column 2 gives the corresponding 
information for Pathmark.  That chain captures an 
additional $1.442 billion in annual sales.  Column 3 
gives the dollar amount of Ahold share of the market 
price increase in millions of dollars.  Assuming no 
change in unit costs, Royal Ahold’s net profits increase 
$82 million each year.  Column 4 indicates that 
Pathmark’s net profits increase $103 million each year.  
Clearly these chains can recoup their $100 million (or 
less) investment to drive Wakefern out of business, if the 
Big V move by itself is sufficient.   
  We would caution that these estimates are just that, 
estimates.  They depend upon the definition of counties 
as relevant geographic markets.  They depend on the 
existence of exogenous or strategic barriers to entry that 
preclude the arrival of new firms at wholesale and retail 
(see Cotterill 2002 for evidence on retail barriers to 
entry). Our results also depend on the estimated 
statistical relationship between the HHI and market 
prices levels.  If we used the relationships between 
concentration and price from other research studies, the 
number would change, however we fully expect 
qualitatively that the results would be the same.  
Consumers will play hundreds of millions of dollars 
more for groceries.  The outcome of the story does not 
change, just the numbers change.   
 
6.  But will Wakefern/ShopRite® be Forced out of 
Business? 
 
  The impact analysis of the last three sections depend 
on the assumption that Wakefern Food Corporation and 
its cooperative group of ShopRite® supermarkets will be The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 64  6 
forced out of business.  In this section we present 
evidence on this point.   
  The bankruptcy of Twin County Cooperative after 
Ahold acquired its two largest members establishes a 
reasonable prior that a similar set of moves would topple 
Wakefern ShopRites®.  Table 8 chronicles the demise of 
Twin County. In 1994, this cooperative wholesaler 
located in Edison, N.J. supplied 165 stores and sold $1.1 
billion at wholesale.  By 1998 it was out of business. 
  Table 8 lists the largest members of Twin County. 
On July 1, 1995, Ahold, via its Stop & Shop subsidiary, 
acquired Twin County’s largest member, Mayfair 
Supermarkets, a New Jersey chain, with $600 million in 
retail sales.  Its 29 stores accounted for 17.5 percent of 
Twin County’s stores and 33% of its wholesale sales 
volume in 1994.  On January 1, 1996, Stop & Shop 
moved again acquiring the Long Island member of Twin 
County, Melmarkets, Inc., a chain with $400 million 
retail sales.  Its 16 stores accounted for 9.7% of Twin 
County’s 1994 store count and 22% of Twin County’s 
1994 sales level.
2   
  These two acquisitions captured 29 of the 38 
superstores that Twin County supplied; its wholesale 
sales volume dropped 45% from 1994 to 1996.  The 
cooperative never recovered and went out of business in 
1997.  What happened to Twin County’s other 
members?  D’Agostino, Food Circus, Norkus, Francis, 
Nicholas, Manyfoods and P.S.K. Supermarkets switched 
to White Rose, SuperValue or Buzzuto’s.  Note that 
these chains operated almost no superstores.  In 2000, 
they operated 47 stores but only 2 were superstores.  
Three independents, Vitale Foodtown, Weisek 
Management, and Francis Market disappear from the 
Marketing Guidebook suggesting that they went out of 
business or were acquired by others.  Nine of their 18 
stores were superstores. 
  What conclusions can we make from the Twin 
County demise that are pertinent to the Wakefern 
situation?  1) If a cooperative wholesaler loses 40-50 
percent of its wholesale sales volume, it goes out of 
business.  A lesser volume may suffice.  2) Stop & Shop 
will make repeated moves to acquire cooperative 
members with superstores in the New York and New 
Jersey area.  3) Most supermarkets operators not 
acquired by Stop & Shop operated small supermarkets.  
They were able to switch to another wholesaler, 
however, these smaller stores do not compete effectively 
against superstores.
3 
                                                             
2 These acquisitions introduced Stop & Shop supermarkets to 
New Jersey and Long Island. 
3 This is especially true for D’Agostino which is located in 
Manhattan, a market unto itself with very few superstores. 
  In conclusion, the Twin County demise is 
suggestive, but in no way does it provide conclusive 
evidence that Stop & Shop’s move on Big V will result 
in the demise of Wakefern ShopRite.   
  Next, let us explain the impact of a Big V exit from 
Wakefern Food Corporation on Wakefern’s wholesaling 
charges to its members.  This is the first step towards 
determining how many ShopRite supermarkets may be 
forced out of business or into a sale to Stop & Shop or 
Pathmark via the bankruptcy route if their acquisition of 
Big V is vetted as a legal strategy.  Wakefern did a very 
extensive and thorough analysis of the cost impact of a 
Big V exit in December 1997. At that time, top 
Wakefern executives realized that Big V was in trouble 
and might attempt to leave the cooperative.  The 
resulting cost impact study was not prepared for 
litigation.   
  According to Wakefern executive Douglas Willy 
who was in charge of the study, it took five to six weeks 
to complete.  Every division vice president was involved 
and impacts were built up from line items in Wakefern’s 
budget.
4  The detail of its method attests to its accuracy.  
It was done in-house with several executives who know 
their specific operations.  This bottom up assembly 
procedure would not introduce a systematic bias absent 
an explicit directive from the top of Wakefern. Wakefern 
executives assure me that no such directive, for example, 
to come in with a high impact estimate was ever given to 
line staff that did this study.  For these reasons its 
estimated impact as of December 1997 are unbiased.   
  Wakefern estimates that the exit of Big V would 
increase the assessment on each member .48% of the 
member’s retail sales.  It would increase the wholesaler’s 
markups an amount equal to .33% of a members retail 
sales.  The combined impact equals .81% of member 
retail sales (Wakefern Food Corporation Impact Study, 
Fiscal 1997/1998). This means that all measures of 
performance below the wholesale cost lines, including 
net before tax profits would be reduced .81% of sales.  
This reduction is not a one shot impact.  It continues 
over several years.     
  Wakefern updated the 1997 study in October 2000.  
According to Mr. Willy, the update was not as extensive 
as the first assessment.  It took about a week to run new, 
more recent data through the parameters and guidelines 
established in the prior study. The exit of Big V 
increases the wholesaler assessment on each retailer an 
amount equal to .57% of the retailer’s sales.  It increases 
the wholesale markup on each retailer an amount equal 
                                                             
4 Information conveyed by Mr. Willy in a telephone 
conference with him, Kenneth Jasinkiewicz and James 
Watson, April 18, 2002. The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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to .32% of the retailer’s sales.  Thus, the total impact is 
now estimated to be .89% of retail sales (Wakefern Food 
Corporation, Big V Impact Study, Fiscal 00/01).   
  How serious is a .89% reduction in net profits?  The 
Food Marketing Institute recently reported, “over the last 
decade, supermarket industry net after tax profits have 
averaged .89 percent a year” (Food Marketing Institute).  
If ShopRite supermarkets a re “average,” and their 
effective corporate tax rate is low, the Big V impact 
wipes out nearly all of their net profits.
5 
  Returning to the domino effect, this leads us to the 
critical question; How many ShopRite stores and what 
percent of wholesale volume would be forced into 
bankruptcy or liquidation by a .89% of retail sales 
reduction in before tax net profits?  To answer this 
question we would need profit and financial leverage 
data for each store or Wakefern member.  Wakefern has 
not supplied such data on its members; however, it 
estimates that 20 stores would be forced into bankruptcy.  
Figure 1 is a frequency chart that orders all ShopRite 
stores, excluding Big V stores by annual sales volume.  
The average ShopRite sells $42.6 million annually.  If 
the 20 impacted stores are average sized stores, the lost 
sales impact on Wakefern Food Corporation would be 
$852 million.  If the 20 impacted stores are the smallest 
in Wakefern Food Corporation, the lost sales volume 
would be $405.6 million.  These lost volume estimates 
constitute 13% and 6.2% of Wakefern’s pre Big V 
wholesale volume ($3.95 billion).  Recall that the loss of 
Big V is 13% of Wakefern volume.  Thus, the 
cumulative first round (Big V) and second round effect 
(loss of another 20 stores) would be a minimum 19.2% 
and quite possibly as high as 26%.  Clearly, the 
assessment and markups after round 2 would be ratchet 
up and pull more ShopRite stores down.  The domino 
effect is real and would cause the cooperative to 
implode.    
  This analysis is driven only by higher wholesaling 
costs, however, predatory moves on the demand side are 
also very real.  Table 9 identifies the largest ShopRite 
members.  If the Big V bankruptcy strategy to exit the 
cooperative is vetted, then Ahold/Pathmark will be 
targeting possibly with price or promotion wars, chains 
such as Foodarama, Village Supermarkets, and Inserra 
Supermarkets, the big 3 after Big V.   
  There are two possible mitigating factors, however, 
they do not prevent the domino effect.  First is the fact 
that if Big V is sold to Ahold/Pathmark, Wakefern will 
receive approximately $75 million as a one-time 
                                                             
5 If their effective tax rate is t, 0#t#1, and the after tax profits 
BA=(1-t) BB where  BB =before tax profits.  If BB decreases 
.89% of sales, then BA decreases (1-t).89% of sales. 
payment (the bankruptcy discounted withdrawal fee).  
However, Wakefern must pay taxes on it and it 
maintains, credibly, that the net amount would quickly 
be consumed in price wars that they see coming from 
Ahold/Pathmark because those chains know the 
ShopRite system is vulnerable to collapse without Big 
V.  Second is the idea that Wakefern could purchase its 
bankrupt stores at severely discounted prices effectively 
shifting the burden of higher costs onto its failing 
members and their creditors.  This argument, however, 
ignores the Big V precedent.  Ahold, Pathmark and any 
other large competitor including C&S Wholesale, who 
would benefit from the demise of the S hopRite group 
would be willing to pay much more for the bankrupt 
stores than a weakened Wakefern would be able to pay.  
Recall that the payoff to Ahold and Pathmark for the 
complete demise of the ShopRite system as $186 million 
each year (Table 7) and their investment in Big V to 
capture this payoff was at most $100 million.  Ahold and 
Pathmark can spend several million dollars picking off 
other Wakefern ShopRite® stores and still recoup their 
investment. 
 
7. The Outside Buyer Option 
   
  If Big V is purchased by an outside buyer, the same 
disastrous cost elevation cycle could destroy 
Wakefern/ShopRite®.  However, the critical question is, 
would an outside buyer be willing to pay more for Big V 
than Wakefern/ShopRite®?  An outside buyer is 
someone who operates no stores in the 
Wakefern/ShopRite® sales region and who chooses to 
not join Wakefern/ShopRite®.  Such a buyer would not 
be willing to pay $255 million for the 27 Big V 
ShopRites® for two very important reasons.  First, an 
outside buyer would not benefit from increased market 
share and increased pricing power in the Big V market 
and trade areas.  Second, an outside buyer would not 
benefit from the implosion of Wakefern/ShopRite® in 
other market areas because it is not already operating 
supermarkets in those areas. 
  An outside buyer would only be willing to pay an 
amount for the Big V chain that reflects a “discount” for 
the amount of investment needed to upgrade the stores to 
competitive parity, and the earnings /cash flow potential 
of those stores in the m arkets where they compete.  
Under these circumstances, an outside buyer could not 
rationally pay a price for the Big V stores that is greater 
than the price that Wakefern/ShopRite® would be 
willing to pay to retain Big V’s stores and their 
contribution to the cooperative’s volume.  Unlike Ahold 
and Pathmark, the outside buyer could not recoup any 
additional investment. The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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Table 1.  Leading Wholesalers in the Northeast Coastal Region
1 
 









Wakefern  205  195  95.1 
C&S Wholesale  615  415  67.5 
White Rose  340  50  14.7 
Buzzuto’s  195  13  6.7 
SuperValu  629  212  33.7 
Fleming  216  45  20.8 
Associated Food Stores  195  0  0.0 
General Trading  170  0  0.0 
Key Foods  115  5  4.3 
Krasdale  275  10  3.6 
 
1 The northeast coastal region is defined to include the Boston, Hartford, New York, Baltimore/Washington, and Philadelphia 
Marketing Guidebook, 2002 market areas. 




Table 2.  Wholesale Market Positions in the Greater New York Market Area 
 










Wakefern  31.07  39.92 
C&S Wholesale  26.83  34.47 
White Rose  17.43  22.4 
Krasdale  6.84   
Key Foods  4.94   
Associated Food Stores  4.64   
General Trading  3.58   
SuperValu  2.50  3.21 
Buzzuto’s  2.18   
CR4  82.17  100.00 
HHI  2106  3294 
HHI if C&S captures all Wakefern  3773  6045 
Increase in HHI  1667  2751 
 
1 Includes only those wholesalers where superstore (sales greater than $12 Million) account for more than 10 percent of store implied 
(Table 1). 
Source:  Trade Dimensions, Marketing Guidebook, 2002.  Interactive Market Systems, Wilton, CT.The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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Table 3.  Wholesale Market Positions in the Greater Philadelphia Market Area 
 









Wakefern  28.85  28.85 
C&S Wholesale  25.97  25.97 
SuperValu  25.59  25.59 
Fleming  19.59  19.59 
CR4  100.00  100.00 
HHI  2545  2545 
HHI if C&S captures all Wakefern sales  4043  4043 
Increase in HHI  1498  1498 
 
1 Includes only those wholesalers where superstore (sales greater than $12 Million) account for more than 10 percent of store implied 
(Table 1). 




Table 4.  Wholesale Market Positions in the Greater Hartford Market Area 
 









C&S Wholesale  47.46  55.63 
SuperValu  21.57  25.28 
Wakefern  16.28  19.08 
Buzzuto’s  14.69   
CR4  100.00  100.00 
HHI  3199  4099 
HHI if C&S captures all Wakefern sales  4744  6222 
Increase in HHI  1545  2123 
 
1 The northeast coastal region is defined to include the Boston, Hartford, New York, Baltimore/Washington, and Philadelphia 
Marketing Guidebook, 2002 market areas. 
Source:  Trade Dimensions, Marketing Guidebook, 2002.  Interactive Market Systems, Wilton, CT 
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Table 5. Consumer Impact of the Ahold/Pathmark Predatory Move on Wakefern/ShopRite 
             
Annual Total 
County  Annual Dollar Impact 
    Pre-merger  Post-merger    % Change  % Change  Supermarket  of Price Change on 
County  State  HHI  HHI  Delta  HHI  Price  Sales (x000)  Consumers (x000) 
Fairfield  CT  2762 3461  699 25.3  1.6 1,366,560  21,857.4
Hartford  CT  2508 2741  233 9.3  0.6 1,321,060  7,756.5
New Haven  CT  3299 4078  779 23.6  1.5 1,233,960  18,415.1
New London  CT  2636 3479  843 32.0  2.0 324,220  6,553.0
   total CT              4,245,800  54,582
                 
New Castle  DE  1811 2205  394 21.8  1.4 782,600  10,760.6
   total DE              782,600  10,761
                 
Atlantic  NJ  3227 2639  -588 -18.2  -1.2 330,980  -3,811.5
Bergen  NJ  1721 2312  591 34.3  2.2 1,726,400  37,468.4
Burlington  NJ  1846 3278  1432 77.6  4.9 540,800  26,513.4
Camden  NJ  1435 2289  854 59.5  3.8 513,500  19,313.6
Cape May  NJ  3901 5288  1387 35.6  2.2 236,600  5,316.6
Cumberland  NJ  2349 3837  1488 63.3  4.0 203,580  8,150.3
Essex  NJ  1302 2285  983 75.5  4.8 959,660  45,790.7
Gloucester  NJ  2987 4464  1477 49.4  3.1 333,580  10,424.7
Hudson  NJ  1630 2020  390 23.9  1.5 612,040  9,254.9
Hunterdon  NJ  3601 2173  -1428 -39.7  -2.5 221,000  -5,538.8
Middlesex  NJ  1456 2350  894 61.4  3.9 1,177,800  45,705.1
Monmouth  NJ  1831 1779  -52 -2.8  -0.2 1,147,900  -2,060.3
Morris  NJ  1043 1850  807 77.4  4.9 976,300  47,740.8
Ocean  NJ  1669 1474  -195 -11.7  -0.7 916,500  -6,767.5
Passaic  NJ  1344 1936  592 44.0  2.8 608,400  16,936.7
Salem  NJ  3421 4285  864 25.3  1.6 70,980  1,133.0
Somerset  NJ  1653 1749  96 5.8  0.4 560,300  2,056.5
Sussex  NJ  4280 2896  -1384 -32.3  -2.0 250,900  -5,127.6
Union  NJ  1444 1681  237 16.4  1.0 614,380  6,372.9
Warren  NJ  2224 5193  2969 133.5  8.4 213,200  17,987.9
   total NJ              12,214,800  276,860
                 
Kings  NY  770 824  54 7.0  0.4 1,310,400  5,808.0
Nassau  NY  1489 1700  211 14.2  0.9 1,780,480  15,945.6
Richmond  NY  2476 3206  730 29.5  1.9 479,440  8,933.5
Rockland  NY  1951 2596  645 33.1  2.1 383,500  8,012.8
Suffolk  NY  1880 2048  168 8.9  0.6 1,816,100  10,256.7
   total NY              5,769,920  48,957
                 
Bucks  PA  1146 1253  107 9.3  0.6 953,160  5,624.5
Chester  PA  1883 2085  202 10.7  0.7 600,600  4,072.0
Lehigh  PA  1193 1295  102 8.5  0.5 487,500  2,634.2
Monroe  PA  2137 3247  1110 51.9  3.3 247,000  8,108.4
Montgomery  PA  1550 1627  77 5.0  0.3 1,055,600  3,314.2
Northampton  PA  1591 1851  260 16.3  1.0 338,884  3,500.0
Philadelphia  PA  1093 1850  757 69.3  4.4 1,314,560  57,540.4
   total PA              4,997,304  84,794
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Table 6. Analysis of the Interaction of Wakfern/ShopRite, Ahold, and Pathmark and the Market Share Gains for the Latter Two Firms 
if Wakefern/ShopRite Fails. 
      Store Numbers  Market Share (%) 
Post Predation 
 Market Share (%)  Increase in Share 
County  St  ShopRite  Ahold  Pathmark  Ahold  Pathmark  Ahold  Pathmark  Ahold  Pathmark 
Fairfield  CT  5 16  0 48.14   55.85  7.71  
Hartford  CT  2 17  0 45.76   47.93  2.17  
New Haven  CT  4 19  0 55.94   62.46  6.52  
New London  CT  2 6  0 44.91   55.72  10.81  
New Castle  DE  3 2  4 5.81  14.62 6.94 17.46 1.13  2.84
Atlantic  NJ  4 0  1  6.68  13.60  6.92
Bergen  NJ  15 12  7 14.98  12.05 26.58 21.37 11.60  9.32
Burlington  NJ  5 2  1 7.45  5.29 11.23 7.97 3.78  2.68
Camden  NJ  4 4  3 16.71  13.92 25.58 21.32 8.87  7.40
Cape May  NJ  1 0  0           
Cumberland  NJ  3 0  1  10.86  23.74  12.88
Essex  NJ  7 1  9 2.44  24.52 4.07 40.89 1.63  16.37
Gloucester  NJ  4 1  1 4.29  7.40 8.09 13.97 3.80  6.57
Hudson  NJ  5 2  5 4.89  26.13 7.62 40.76 2.73  14.63
Hunterdon  NJ  2 1  0 7.65   17.57  9.92  
Middlesex  NJ  12 7  8 12.25  18.76 21.81 33.40 9.56  14.64
Monmouth  NJ  9 5  7 8.61  15.52 12.58 22.68 3.97  7.16
Morris  NJ  10 3  7 6.66  16.11 12.25 29.66 5.59  13.55
Ocean  NJ  7 6  3 11.06  10.50 20.10 19.07 9.04  8.57
Passaic  NJ  5 3  5 10.26  19.44 15.84 30.03 5.58  10.59
Salem  NJ  1 0  0           
Somerset  NJ  6 4  2 13.92  9.28 26.55 17.70 12.63  8.42
Sussex  NJ  3 1  0 10.88   28.77  17.89  
Union  NJ  5 5  4 14.60  20.31 20.26 28.19 5.66  7.88
Warren  NJ  3 1  0 8.54   22.58  14.04  
Kings  NY  1 2  7 6.55  17.76 6.88 18.67 0.33  0.91
Nassau  NY  3 15  13 19.57  19.57 21.14 21.14 1.57  1.57
Richmond  NY  3 0  4  31.45  45.17  13.72
Rockland  NY  5 4  2 22.37  12.20 40.00 21.82 17.63  9.62
Suffolk  NY  2 16  14 19.26  20.26 20.15 21.20 0.89  0.94
Bucks  PA  2 0  4  11.18  11.86  0.68
Chester  PA  1 0  0           
Lehigh  PA  1 0  0           
Monroe  PA  2 0  0           
Montgomery  PA  1 0  1  3.69  3.79  0.10
Northampton  PA  1 0  0           
Philadelphia  PA  11 0  8   17.60   24.92   7.32
   Average      16.94  15.21 23.94 22.93 7.00  7.72
   Total    160 155  118    
 
Source: Data in Attachment A. The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 64  13 
Table 7. Sales and Profit Impacts for Ahold and Pathmark if Wakefern/ShopRite Fails 
 
Increase in 
Annual Sales (x000) 
Increase in Annual Profits 
Profits due to Price Increase (x000) 
County  State  Ahold  Pathmark  Ahold  Pathmark 
Fairfield  CT  105,361.8 0.0 12,207.4 0.0
Hartford  CT  28,667.0 0.0 3,717.7 0.0
New Haven  CT  80,454.2 0.0 11,502.1 0.0
New London  CT  35,048.2 0.0 3,651.3 0.0
   Total    249,531.2 0.0 31,078.5 0.0
   
New Castle  DE  8,843.4 22,225.8 746.8 1,878.8
   Total    8,843.4 22,225.8 746.8 1,878.8
   
Atlantic  NJ  0.0 22,903.8 0.0 -518.4
Bergen  NJ  200,262.4 160,900.5 9,959.1 8,007.0
Burlington  NJ  20,442.2 14,493.4 2,977.5 2,113.1
Camden  NJ  45,547.5 37,999.0 4,940.4 4,117.7
Cape May  NJ  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cumberland  NJ  0.0 26,221.1 0.0 1,934.9
Essex  NJ  15,642.5 157,096.3 1,863.7 18,723.8
Gloucester  NJ  12,676.0 21,916.2 843.4 1,456.3
Hudson  NJ  16,708.7 89,541.5 705.2 3,772.3
Hunterdon  NJ  21,923.2 0.0 -973.2 0.0
Middlesex  NJ  112,597.7 172,429.9 9,968.3 15,265.5
Monmouth  NJ  45,571.6 82,189.6 -259.2 -467.3
Morris  NJ  54,575.2 132,288.7 5,848.2 14,159.9
Ocean  NJ  82,851.6 78,544.1 -1,360.3 -1,290.6
Passaic  NJ  33,948.7 64,429.6 2,682.8 5,086.1
Salem  NJ  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Somerset  NJ  70,765.9 47,177.3 546.0 364.0
Sussex  NJ  44,886.0 0.0 -1,475.2 0.0
Union  NJ  34,773.9 48,413.1 1,291.1 1,796.5
Warren  NJ  29,933.3 0.0 4,061.7 0.0
   Total    843,106.4 1,156,544.1 41,619.5 74,520.9
   
Kings  NY  4,324.3 11,924.6 399.6 1,084.3
Nassau  NY  27,953.5 27,953.5 3,370.9 3,370.9
Richmond  NY  0.0 65,779.2 0.0 4,035.3
Rockland  NY  67,611.1 36,892.7 3,205.1 1,748.4
Suffolk  NY  16,163.3 17,071.3 2,066.7 2,174.4
   Total    116,052.2 159,621.4 9,042.3 12,413.4
   
Bucks  PA  0.0 6,481.5 0.0 667.1
Chester  PA  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lehigh  PA  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Monroe  PA  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Montgomery  PA  0.0 1,055.6 0.0 125.6
Northampton  PA  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philadelphia  PA  0.0 96,225.8 0.0 14,339.1
   Total    0.0 103,762.9 0.0 15,131.7
   
  Grand Total    1,217,533.1 1,442,154.2 82,487.1 103,944.8
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Table 8. Documentation of the Demise of Twin County Grocers Cooperative: Annual Sales and Store Count Data for the 
Wholesale and Leading Members. 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  2000 
Twin County Grocers Total Company             
# stores  165  139  110  105     
Total Wholesale Sales ($ Billion)  1.1  0.8
2  0.6  0.7     
             
Twin County Members
1             
Mayfair Supermarkets             
Elizabeth, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  29/21           
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.6           
% of Twin County  33.27           
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC         
Change of Ownership    S&S  S&S  S&S  S&S  S&S 
             
Melmarkets Inc.
3             
Garden City, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  18/8  16/8         
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.4  0.39         
% of Twin County  22.2  21.6         
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC         
Change of Ownership      S&S  S&S  S&S  S&S 
             
Food Circus Supermarkets             
Middletown, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  12/2  12/8  12/8  12/8  11/5  11/5 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.191  0.189  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.159 
% of Twin County  10.6  10.5  17.3  15.7     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC  TC  TC  WR  WR 
Change of Ownership             
             
D'Agostino             
Larchmont, NY             
# stores/# superstores  26/0  26/0  25/0  25/0  25/0  24/0 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.19  0.191  0.187  0.2  0.2  0.182 
% of Twin County  10.5  10.6  19.0  17.4     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC  TC  TC  SV  SV 
Change of Ownership             
             
Vitale Foodtown, Old Tappan, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  12/7  10/6  10/6       
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.12  0.1  0.1       
% of Twin County  6.7  5.5  10.2       
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC  TC       
Change of Ownership             
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Table 8. Continued 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  2000 
Weisek Management Inc.             
Clifton, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  7/0  6/0         
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.07  0.07         
% of Twin County  3.88  3.88         
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC         
Change of Ownership             
             
Norkus Enterprises             
Point Pleasant, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  5/0    4/0  4/0  4/0  6/0 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.096    0.063  0.07  0.08  0.11 
% of Twin County  5.3    6.4  6.1     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC    TC  TC  WR  WR 
Change of Ownership             
             
Francis Market Ltd.             
Neptune City, NJ             
# stores/# superstores    2/0  2/0  2/0  2/0   
Retail Sales ($ Billion)    0.05  0.05  0.044  0.054   
% of Twin County    2.8  5.1  3.8     
Grocery Wholesaler    TC  TC  TC  WR   
Change of Ownership  Norkus  Francis         
             
Nicholas             
Haledon, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  4/0  5/1  10/0  9/0  9/0  4/0 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.06  0.055  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.061 
% of Twin County  3.3  3.1  12.2  9.6     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC  TC  TC  Buz  Buz 
Change of Ownership             
             
Davidson Bros.             
East Brunswick, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  4/0  4/3  4/3  3/3     
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.08  0.05  0.067  0.057     
% of Twin County  4.4  2.8  6.8  5.0     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC  TC  TC  TC     
Change of Ownership             
             
Manyfoods Inc, Whippany, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  3/0  3/0  2/0  2/2  2/2  2/2 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.04  0.042  0.03  0.039  0.041  0.036 
% of Twin County  2.2  2.3  3.1  3.4     
Grocery Wholesaler  TC   TC   TC   TC   WR  WR 
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Table 8. Continued.     
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  2000 
             
P.S.K. Supermarkets             
Mt. Vernon, NY             
# stores/# superstores      10/0  10/0  10/0  11/0 
Retail Sales ($ Billion)      0.08  0.088  0.055  0.071 
% of Twin County      8.1  7.7     
Grocery Wholesaler      TC  TC  WR  WR 
Change of Ownership             
 
Source: Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook, various years.   
1 Ranked by 1994 Sales           
2 Prorates Mayfair one half year since it was acquired by Royal Ahold, July 1, 1995 (Trade Dimensions, Marketing 
Guidebook, 1996. 
3 Stop & Shop purchased Melmarkets at the end of 1995 (Food Institute Report, 10/16/1995. 
S&S= Stop & Shop, WR=White Rose, TC=Twin County, SV=SuperValu, Buz=Buzzutto’s The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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Table 9. Sales and Store Numbers for Wakefern Food Corporation and its Leading Members: 1994-2000. 
  1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 2000
Wakefern Food Corporation Total Company   
# stores  175 181 189 189  195 205
Total Wholesale Sales ($ Billion)  3.7 4.1 4.1 4  3.95 3.95
             
Wakefern Members
1             
New York Market Area           
Big V, Florida, NY             
# stores/# superstores  31/31 32/32 31/31 32/32  32/32 32/32
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.662 0.689 0.69 0.763  0.814 0.84
% WFC Sales
2  10.9 10.3 10.3 11.6  12.6 13.0
   
Village Super Market, Springfield, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  24/12  24/12 24/12  23/12 22/11
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.695 0.677 0.689 0.689  0.704 NA 
% WFC Sales  11.5 10.1 10.3 10.5  10.9 NA 
             
Foodarama, Freehold, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  18/NA 18/NA 20/NA 20/NA  21/17 22/18
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.607 0.54 0.601 0.637  0.697 0.886
% WFC Sales  10.0 8.0 8.9 9.7  10.8 13.7
             
Inserra Supermarkets, Mahwah, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  25/16 24/16 23/16 23/16  22/15 22/15
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.575 0.71
% WFC Sales  8.2 7.4 7.4 7.6  8.9 11.0
             
Ronetco Supermarkets, Ledgewood, NJ           
# stores/# superstores  5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5  6/6 6/6
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.132 0.181 0.161 0.204  0.232 0.268
% WFC Sales  2.2 2.7 2.4 3.1  3.6 4.1
             
Glass Gardens, Rochelle Park, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6  7/7 7/7
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.167 0.172 0.177 0.17  0.21 0.281
% WFC Sales  2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6  3.2 4.3
             
Perlmart, Toms River, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  5/5 4/4 4/4 4/4  4/4 5/5
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.13 0.135 0.125 0.13  0.14 0.169
% WFC Sales  2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0  2.2 2.6
Source: Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook, various years. 
1 Ranked by size (1998 Sales) in each market area. 
2 Estimated by multiplying the ratio of a members retail sales to Wakefern wholesale sales by .61. This adjustment factor comes from the fact that 
Big V is 13% of Wakefern’s wholesale business.  In 2000, the ratio of Big V retail to Wakefern wholesale sales was 21.3%.  To obtain the 13% 
figure, one must multiply 21.3 by .61.  We have mad the same adjustment for all other firms.The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 64  18 
 
Table 9. Continued           
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  2000
Colalillo Shoprite, Fleming, NJ             
# stores/# superstores          3/3  3/3
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)          0.063  0.11
% WFC Sales          1.0  1.7
             
ShopRite, Edison, N.J.             
# stores/# superstores          8/8  8/8
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)             
% WFC Sales             
             
Philadelphia Market Area           
Zallie Supermarkets             
Clementon, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  6/3  6/3  6/4  7/4  8/5  7/5
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.185  0.15  0.17  0.187  0.23  0.275
% WFC Sales  3.1  2.2  2.5  2.9  3.6  4.2
             
Supermarkets of Cherry Hill           
Cherry Hill, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  7/0  7/4  6/4  4/4  4/4  4/4
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.122  0.12  0.125  0.09  0.12  0.188
% WFC Sales  2.0  1.8  1.9  1.4  1.9  2.9
             
Shoprite of Pennington           
Trenton, NJ             
# stores/# superstores  5/0  5/0  5/0  5/0  5/0  
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.099  0.105  0.105  0.101  0.106  
% WFC Sales  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6  
             
Glazier             
Philadelphia, PA             
# stores/# superstores          3/3  
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)          0.045  
% WFC Sales          0.7  
             
Landis Supermarkets             
Telford, PA             
# stores/# superstores        2/2  2/2  2/2
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)        0.04  0.041  0.044
% WFC Sales        0.6  0.6  0.7
             
Delaware Supermarket Inc.             
Wilmington, DE             
# stores/# superstores        2/0  2/0  
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)        0.035  0.035  
% WFC Sales        0.5  0.5  The Predatory Impacts of the Ahold/Pathmark Offer to Buy Big V  Cotterill 
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Table 9. Continued.     
Shoprite  1994  1995 1996 1997  1998 2000
Philadelphia, PA             
# stores/# superstores      3/0 3/0  3/0 5/0
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)      0.035 0.03  0.032 0.11
% WFC Sales      0.5 0.5  0.5 1.7
             
Brown's Super Store Inc.           
Bellmawr, NJ             
# stores/# superstores            6/6
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)            0.15
% WFC Sales            2.3
             
Hartford Market Area           
Grade A Supermarkets           
Norwalk, CT             
# stores/# superstores  3/2  3/3 4/4 4/4  4/4 5/5
Total Retail Sales ($ Billion)  0.101  0.11 0.105 0.108  0.122 0.182
% WFC Sales  1.7  1.6 1.6 1.6  1.9 2.8
   
   
Histogram of Shop Rite Store Annual Sales
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Avg=$42.6 Million StDev=$14.1 Million N=161, Total sales of smallest 20 stores =$405.6 Million
Source: Wakefern Food Corp. Store Level Data Base, March 2002, Attachment A
Figure 1. 
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